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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A. ISAACSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAIR DORIUS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and Case No. 18166 
LAWRENCE W. LYNN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CLAIR DORIUS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE 
.CONTAINED IN REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered in the 
trial court on November 13, 1981. Defendant and appellant filed 
his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 1981. On December 31, 1981, 
plaintiffs and respondents made a ~otion in this court to Dismiss 
this appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the said 
Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. This Court denied said 
motion after hearing on June 18, 1982, "without prejudice to 
raise as an issue on appeal." 
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The issue of jurisdiction was raised as an issue on 
appeal by respondents in their Brief Raising Jurisdictional Issue, 
which was set forth as Point II in the Brief of Respondents filed 
herein. 
Appellant has filed a response to that jurisdictional 
issue in a brief entitled Reply Brief of Appellant, served by mail 
on December 31, 1982. In fact, the said Reply Brief is devoted 
entirely to the jurisdictional issue raised by respondents. Thus, 
had appellant filed a reply brief on the non-jurisdictional issues, 
respondents would have no right to further respond by brief thereto. 
However, since respondents have raised the jurisdictional issue, 
and appellant has responded thereto, respondents properly have the 
right to reply to the material raised by the appellant on the juris-
dictional issue, and respondents respectfully submit the following 
as their response thereto. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. NOTICE OF APPEAL OF DEFENDAi.~T AND APPELLANT, CLAIR DORIUS, 
WAS NOT TIMELY. 
Appellant attempts to establish the timeliness of his 
appeal by resort to two arguments as follows: 
(1) Appellant claims that Section 63-37-1, et seq .. , Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, applies to the courts and must be 
construed as providing that the Notice of Appeal mailed to the Clerk 
of the Court shall be deemed filed when mailed; and 
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(2) Appellant claims that he is entitled to the benefit 
of Rule 6(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in this case and is 
thus entitled to one month and three days in which to file Notice 
of Appeal. 
We desire to deal briefly with each of these propositions. 
( 1) SECTION 63-37-1, ET SEQ., IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE COURTS. 
Appellant appears to concede that Rule 73(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, grants appellant one month in which to appeal 
and appears to concede that that rule requires that the appeal be 
filed with the District Court. The argument then proceeds that 
Rule S(e) defines filing as being filed with the Clerk of the court 
and the argument then proceeds that, since the Clerk of the Court 
is also the County Clerk, and since the County is a political sub-
division, then therefore the County Clerk is a sort of political sub-
division, and therefore papers sent to this Clerk pursuant to said 
Section 63-37-1, et seq., must be deemed filed when mailed. 
We respectfully submit that that result does not follow 
at all. Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah pro-
vides that the County Clerks "shall be ex officio clerks of the 
District Courts." Thus, these Clerks duly have a dual role .. They 
are County Clerks and as such carry out a role in county government, 
and they are Clerks of the Court and as such are an integral part 
of the court system. This dual role is clearly spelled out in Sec-
tion 17-20-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, where it 
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provides that the County Clerk is "clerk of the district court" 
and is "clerk of the board of county commissioners." In Section 
17-20-2 the Clerk's duties as Clerk of the court are enumerated, 
and in Section 17-20-4 the Clerk's duties as County Clerk are 
enumerated. As Clerk of the Court he is no doubt under the juris-
diction and control of the judicial branch, and as County Clerk, 
he can no doubt be considered a part of county government and sub-
ject to its rules. Procedures on the county side of his job do not 
become a part of the judicial branch merely because the Clerk has a 
dual role. Thus, even if Section 63-37-1, et seq., is applicable 
to the County Clerk in his county role, it does not apply to him as 
Clerk of the Court, and certainly not in contravention of the rules 
of court. Appellant himself concedes at page 6 of his brief that: 
"It is obvious that the Courts are a separate branch 
of government under the separation of powers of the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah and as such, are not controlled 
by the legislative pronouncements." 
That admission appears to be dispositive of the matter. 
In addition, however, the fact that the courts are nowhere 
mentioned in Section 63-37-1, et seq., compels the conclusion that 
the courts were not intended to be covered by it, and this same 
result is compelled when one considers the rather absurd conse-
quences that would result in the courts if mailing to the courts 
were to be held to be the equivalent of filing with the courts. Let 
us briefly consider some provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
that would be affected if mailing to the court were to be held to 
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be the equivalent of filing with the court. 
Rule 3(a), URCP. This rule provides that an action can 
be conunenced by filing a complaint or by service of summons. If 
Section 63-37-1 were applicable, then the complaint would be filed 
when mailed to the court. Of course, one might raise the objection 
that the complaint should not be deemed filed until the fee for 
filing were actually paid. However, Section 63-37-1 also applies 
to "any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the 
state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof." Thus, 
under Section 63-37-1, a complaint mailed to court with the proper 
fee would be deemed filed when mailed, notwithstanding it might not 
be received by the Clerk for some days and perhaps for months if it 
went astray. This could create some considerable difficulty in many 
areas, not the least of which could be in connection with the Sta-
tutes of Limitation. What has been said with respect to conunencing 
a suit by filing a complaint would apply with equal force to the 
filing of a complaint after service of a ten-day summons. Under 
present practice, if a ten-day summons is served, but the complaint 
is not filed within ten days, the action is deemed dismissed. How-
ever, it mailing equals filing, then the status of the case could 
be up in the air for a considerable period of time if the complaint, 
filing fee and ten-day summons goes astray in the mail. It would, 
of course, be very easy for a party (we can assume that attorneys 
would not engage in any such practice) to assert that he had 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
actually mailed the documents to court earlier than they were 
actually mailed, and this procedure would at the very least 
impose upon the courts numerous hearings to determine the actual 
date of mailing, which would probably not be a salutary thing to 
inflict on the courts in view of their already overcrowded con-
dition. 
We desire also to call attention to the current form of 
surrunons (see Form 1 of Appendix to Forms of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) . The current form provides that the sununons state, 
among other things, that defendant be notified· that he is "hereby 
summoned and required to file an answer in writing to the attached 
complaint with the clerk of the above-entitled court, and to serve 
upon, or mail to ... plaintiff's attorneys, a copy of said answer." 
Earlier forms of the surrunons required only that the answer be· served 
within twenty days, but did not specify that the answer had to be 
filed with the twenty days. This created much uncertainty at court, 
particularly in connection with applications for default judgments. 
The requirement that the summons state that the answer be served 
and filed within the twenty days no doubt sought to clarify this 
confusion. The position asserted by appellant, however, would 
return us to that state of confusion. If mailing is the equivalent 
of filing, then a defendant could serve a copy of the answer to his 
opponent and mail the original to the court. The court, however, 
would still not necessarily know on the twenty-first day whether an 
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answer had been properly made. Given the current postal service, 
one can suppose that answers would come drizzling in one, two, 
three or more days beyond the twentieth day, creating no end of 
confusion. 
Rule S(d), URCP. This rule now contemplates no doubt 
a physical filing of the papers with the court, but would hereafter 
have to be construed as meaning that a party would only have to mail 
the papers to court to satisfy the requirements o.f this rule. 
Rule S(e), URCP. As presently written, this rule provides 
that papers can be filed with the judge. One supposes that if mailing 
is the equivalent of filing, the papers mailed to the judge mightbe 
construed to be filed when mailed to the judge. Presumably differ-
ent judges might construe this differently. Some judges might 
endorse on the paper t~e date of the postmark on the envelope;. some 
might endorse thereon the date they received the paper; and some 
might decline to accept it· at all. Other variations can be imagined, 
all of which would seem to create more confusion--rather than less. 
Rule 14(a), URCP. Under this rule, a third-party plaintiff 
need not obtain leave to make service if he files a third-party com-
plaint not later than ten days after he serves his original answer. 
If mailing means filing, we introduce into third-party practice fur-
ther ambiguities. 
Rule 3l(c), URCP. Practice under this rule would be 
affected. However, instead of giving notice of filing, one could 
presumably meet the requirement here by giving notice ·of mailing to 
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the court. 
Rule 38(b), URCP. This rule provides that jury trial 
may be obtained by paying the statutory fee and serving a demand. 
Since payments under 63-37-1, et seq., are effective when mailed7 
a jury could be demanded and paid for by mail, al~hough the court 
might never receive the documents relating thereto, or in any event 
might receive them after some delay. Most, if not all, of the dis-
trict courts have rules providing that demand for jury trial must 
be made a given number of days prior to trial (ten days for example) 
Under such a court rule, if the mail were delayed, the court might 
not receive the jury demand until so close to the date for trial 
that it would impose difficulties on the court in scheduling jury 
trial and in arranging for juries. 
Rule 41, URCP. Under this rule a case can be dismissed 
by filing a notice of dismissal or by filing a stipulation of dis-
missal at court. If mailing is the equivalent of filing, then-
cases will be dismissed when notice of dismissal or stipulation is 
mailed, although the court may have no record thereof at the time 
of dismissal, and in some cases for some days thereafter, and in 
some instances for protracted periods of time if these items are 
lost in the mail. This could result in serious consequences, par-
ticularly in the area of real estate titles. 
Rule 5.1, URCP. This rule provides for the filing of. 
written requests for instructions. To hold that the same can be 
mailed results in an absurdity. 
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Rule 54(d) (2), URCP. This rule provides a memorandum 
of costs must be served and filed within a five-day period. 
Mailing this document to the court could again result in many 
ambiguities, which would not be conducive to the expeditious 
administration of justice. 
Rule 58(a), URCP. This rule provides that judgments are 
deemed entered when they are signed and filed. We can assume that 
judges are usually present in the county in question when they sign 
judgments and that the same will therefore normally be filed with-
out incident. However, in rural counties a judgment signed by a 
judge in one county and then mailed by him to the proper county would 
have to be· deemed f~led when mailed if mailing were held to be the 
equivalent of filing, and this could conceivably create serious 
problems in connection with land titles and in other areas as well. 
Rule 68, URCP. Rule 68 provides for deposits in court 
and presumably under Section 63-37-1, et seq., if a check were 
mailed to the court, mailing would create a good deposit, notwith-
standing the court had not yet received the same and might not for 
some time receive the same. 
Appellate practice. The present practice requires filing 
of documents in connection with appeals to the Supreme Court in at 
least the following instances: 
Rule 73(a), Notice of Appeal, 
Rule 73(c), Bond on Appeal, 
Rule 73(g), Record on Appeal, 
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Rule 73A, Docketing Statement, 
Rule 75(a), Designation of Record, 
Rule 75(a) (1), Certificate of Ordering Transcript, 
Rule 75(b), Filing Transcript, 
Rule 75(p) (1), Filing Appellant's Brief, Respondent's 
Brief and Reply Briefs, 
Rule 76(e) (1), Petition for Rehearing, 
Rule 76(e) (2), Answer to Petition for Rehearing, 
Rule 76(d) and 
Rule 54(d) (3), Time for Seeking Costs After Filing 
of Remittitur. 
If Section 63-27-1, et seq., imposes on the courts the 
rule that mailing is the equivalent of filing, then all of the 
foregoing steps in the appellate procedure will satisfactorily be 
met by litigants' mailing the items in question to the court. The 
effective date would be the date of mailing, not the date of filing. 
Compliance with the rules of the court would be much more difficult 
and ambiguities as to when an item was filed would be multiplied 
many times over. There would be practically no certainty as to 
when any step were taken as that step would always be subject to 
proof that the item in question had been mailed, notwithstanding 
it was not received by the Supreme Court at any particular time. 
One can imagine that this court, if it sought to attempt to enforce 
compliance with its rules would be bombarded with an unending stream 
of petitions of objections relating to late filings or petitions 
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to determine the date of mailing, all of which would greatly 
hinder the administration of justice in the Supreme Court. 
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(2) RULE 6(e) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO APPEALS TO THE SUPREME 
COURT. 
On pages 8 and 9 of appellant's brief, appellant con-
structs an argument w~ich attempts to demonstrate that appellant 
actually had until December 16 in which to file Notice of Appeal. 
As we understand it, this argument consists of the following 
reasoning: Appellant argues that Rule 77(d) provides that the 
Clerk of the Court shall mail to the parties a notice of the 
entry of an order or judgment. The reasoning then proceeds that 
since the Clerk is supposed to send such an order by mail, one must 
assume that the order was mailed for purposes of computing time. 
The argument then proceeds to Rule 6(e), which provides that "when-
ever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take 
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon him, and the notice or paper is served 
upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.-" 
From here the reasoning proceeds as follows: That since the Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial was entered on November 13, the one-
month period ended December 13, and if three days are added thereto 
December 16 becomes the time for filing the appeal. 
There are a number of serious problems, however, with this 
reasoning. First of all, it is directly contrary to the statute. 
Appellant completely ignores the portions of Rule 77(d) which 
directly preclude his argument. We set forth Rule 77(d) in its 
entirety and underline the relevant portions thereof omitted by appellant. 
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"(d) Notice of Orders or Judgments. At the time of 
presenting any written order or judgment to the court for 
signing, the party seeking such order or judgment shall 
deposit with the clerk sufficient copies thereof for 
mailing as hereinafter required. Immediately upon the 
entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a 
notice of the entry by mail in the manner provided for 
.in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for 
failure to appear, and shall make a note in the docket 
of the mailing. Such mailing is sufficient notice for 
all purposes for which notice of the entry of an order 
is required by these Rules; but any party may in addition 
serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in 
Rule 5 for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the 
entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or 
relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for 
failure to appeal within the time allowed." 
It is readily seen that appellant has totally ignored 
the direct mandate of Section 77(d) that failure by the Clerk to 
send a notice of entry "does not affect the time to appeal or 
relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party from failure 
to appeal within the time allowed." Thus, even if the Clerk fails 
to send the notice of appeal, the appeal time remains unaffected. 
In the instant case, the Clerk did not send a notice of 
entry of judgment; rather notice thereof was sent by counsel for 
the respondents. It is thus inescapable that appellant's argument 
runs squarely into, and is totally nullified by, the wording of 
Rule 77(d). Furthermore, Rule 6(e) provides that one is only 
entitled to the additional three days if one is to take a certain 
action within a prescribed period after service of a notice or 
other paper upon him. In the case of an appeal, the time for an 
appeal does not run after notice of entry of judgment, but rather 
runs after entry of judgment. It is therefore clear that Rule 6(e) 
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has no application to appeals. 
Rule 73(a) provides: 
19 When an appeal is permitted from a district court to 
the Supreme court, the time within which an appeal may be 
taken shall be one month from the date of the entry ... of 
the judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter time 
is prescribed by law . . • " 
It is thus clear that the appeal time runs from the 
entry of the order or judgment~. not from notice thereof. The 
rule is different with regard to an appeal from a city or justice 
court to the district court. Rule 73(h) provides: 
"An appeal may be taken to the district court from 
a final judgment rendered in a city or justice court 
within one month after notice of the entry of such judg-
ment, or within such shorter time as may be provided 
by law." 
Therefore, appellant's argument might have some validity 
for an appeal to the district court. It has no validity whatever 
with regard to the Supreme Court. 
POINT II~ THE DOCTRINE OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS NOT APPLICABLE IN 
THIS CASE. 
It should be noted that Rule 73(a) provides for a pro-
cedure to be followed in cases where there is "excusable neglect." 
That rule provides for a determination of the issue of excusable 
neglect by the district court where it is properly raised. The 
appellant has never claimed excusable neglect in this action; it 
has never been asserted, either in the lower court or in this court. 
There is a reference on page 8 of appellant's Reply Brief which 
states: 
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"It was reasonable for defendant-appellant's counsel 
to expect that the Notice of Appeal mailed in the 10th of 
December ... would be received and docketed by the clerk 
well before any appeal deadline." 
Whether such an expectation was reasonable under all of 
the circumstances, and whether counsel was justified in relying on 
such an expectation or had some duty beyond such expectation, is 
not before this Court. Had there been excusable neglect, appellant 
could have filed a petition so alleging and had a hearing on that 
issue, but has never done that; it has never been sought either in 
the lower court or in this court. Had there been such a hearing, 
the lower court could have ruled on the issue and either party, 
aggrieved presumably, could have appealed the matter to this court 
for consideration. Under familiar doctrines of appellate review, 
however, where the matter has not been raised in the lower court, 
it is not available for review in this court. 
On pages 10 and 11 of appellant's Reply Brief, appellant 
cites the cases of Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 Fed 2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980) 
and United States v. Solley, 545 Fed 2d 874 (3rd Cir. 1976). Appel-
lant cites those cases for the proposition, and said cases hold, 
that notice of appeal is filed when it is received in the Clerk's 
office, not when it is docketed in some formal way. Appellant then 
goes on to state that: 
"Appellant was reasonably entitled to expect that it 
(the notice of aooeal) was received in the Clerk's Office 
prior to the dat~ ... on which it was entered on the docket." 
We are not entirely certain what the appellant is saying 
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here, but if appellant is saying that he was entitled to expect 
that notice of appeal would be received in the Clerk's office 
earlier than it was, then his relief, if any, would have been 
under the provisions for excusable neglect. If appellant is 
saying that the notice of appeal was received in the Clerk's 
office earlier than it was docketed, that assertion is totally 
unsupported. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, 
the date stamped upon the notice of appeal must be presumed to be 
the date upon which ~t was received by the Clerk. 
Therefore, Aldabe and Solley are not applicable under 
the facts of this case. 
Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 625 Fed 2d 521 (5th Cir. 
1980) is illustrative of the principle of excusable neglect, which 
has never been claimed by appellant, nor relief sought thereunder. 
In Sanchez the notice of appeal was mailed timely, but was filed 
out of time. Appellee moved for dismissal. The circuit court 
remanded the case to the district court for hearing on excusable 
neglect, which was a relief prayed for by appellant in the cir- · 
cuit court. This case was before this honorable court in January 
1982 on respondents' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
and appellant did not request relief pursuant to the principle of 
excusable neglect, but elected to stand upon his assertion that 
his notice of appeal was timely filed under applicabl·e _law. The 
appellant has not sought such relief now and, indeed, having waited 
a year and having permitted briefs in this matter to be filed and 
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the case being now ready for oral argument, it would indeed be an 
imposition upon the Court and counsel to consider the factual issue 
of excusable neglect at this stage of the proceedings. 
In The United States v. Nunley, 369 Fed.Supp. 171 (1973 
D.C. Tenn), the court upheld the untimely filing of a notice of 
appeal, but did so upon the ground that the clerk's office to which 
the appeal was sent had been closed on two days when it should have 
been open, and for this reason decreed that the appeal was timely. 
The court stated: 
"Obviously, had such Winchester District office of 
the clerk been open with the deputy clerk in attendance 
in accordance with the established schedule, the defend-
ant's notice of an appeal was mailed in time for the 
notice of appeal to have·been filed by such deputy clerk 
within the required lO~day." 
This case is cited by appellant,but reaffirms the position 
of respondent that filing means actual receipt by the off ice of 
the Clerk and not mailing, and in appropriate cases relief can be 
sought under the principles of excusable neglect. Relief pursuant 
to excusable neglect has never been asserted, nor claimed by the 
appellant, and the doctrine is inapplicable in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, respondents respectfully 
pray that appellant's appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 
or in the alternative that they be granted relief in accordance 
with the brief of respondents heretofore filed herein. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED this 
-18-
day of February, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted: 
·GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondants 
320 South Third East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing brief to 
M. Dayle Jeffs, attorney for appellant, at his address, 90 North 
100 East, P. O. Box.683, Provo, Utah 84603, postage prepaid, 
this ~~3......_~ day of February, 1983. 
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